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Abstract 
In this paper I present a secondary qualitative analysis of archived audio data from two 
conditions (‘voice-feedback’ and ‘women as subjects’) in Milgram’s experiments. Using a 
perspective informed by rhetorical and discursive psychologies, I focus on the rhetorical 
strategies employed by participants. This highlights the use of strategies based around direct 
invocations of ‘knowledge’. Analysis explores the ways in which participants could use such 
strategies to challenge the experimenter’s definition of the situation in their efforts to 
extricate themselves from the experiment. Findings are discussed in relation to two ongoing 
debates in the study of Milgram’s experiments: First, the importance of attending to defiance 
and resistance as much as compliance and obedience; second, the questioning of the status of 
the phenomena captured in Milgram’s studies as necessarily being concerned with 
‘(dis)obedience’. 
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Discourse, defiance and rationality: ‘Knowledge work’ in the ‘obedience’ experiments. 
There has been a recent surge of interest in the materials from Stanley Milgram’s 
obedience experiments held in the archives at Yale University. Scholars have used these 
materials to explore a number of historical, methodological and ethical issues (Gibson, 
2013a; Millard, 2011, 2014; Nicholson, 2011; Perry, 2012; Russell, 2011). However, there 
have been relatively few attempts to use the archived data as the basis for secondary analysis 
(see Modigliani & Rochat, 1995 for an exception). Indeed, there has been no previous 
attempt to use recent developments in qualitative data analysis to shed light on what actually 
happened as Milgram’s experimental sessions unfolded. In an earlier article (Gibson, 2013b), 
I outlined the possibilities afforded by drawing on the insights of rhetorical psychology 
(Billig, 1996) to undertake such an analysis. In the present paper, I develop this approach 
further in two ways. First, the present analysis focuses specifically on the rhetorical strategies 
used by defiant participants in their attempts to extricate themselves from the experimental 
situation. The rationale for this focus is that whereas discussions of the experiments 
frequently highlight the levels of ‘obedience’ uncovered by Milgram, there is a tendency to 
neglect the defiance shown by many participants (see also Reicher, Haslam & Miller, 2014). 
In switching the focus of analysis in this way, we therefore move from questions of why so 
many people appear to obey the experimenter, to questions of how many other people 
managed to defy the experimenter. Second, the present analysis is concerned directly with the 
discursive psychological imperative to explore the ways in which psychological terms are 
used to perform particular social actions (Edwards & Potter, 1992). In contrast to the myriad 
attempts to work out what, psychologically speaking, was going on in the experiments, my 
concern is with psychological categories as participants’ resources. That is, with how the 
psychological terms are used by participants themselves as they seek to argue their way out 
of the experiment. 
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In previous commentary on Milgram’s experiments, the status of participants’ 
understanding of, and beliefs about, the situation in which they found themselves has often 
been central. To take just one example, Orne and Holland’s (1968) critique of the 
experiments as being compromised by demand characteristics relies on the assumption that 
participants knew that the experiment was in all probability not all that it seemed. Responses 
to this line of criticism (see Blass, 2004; Miller, 1986, for summaries) have typically 
suggested that, if anything, this actually demonstrates Milgram’s basic point that trust in the 
experimenter (and the wider institutions which he represents) could lead people to carry out 
potentially extreme actions. There was no way of knowing for sure that the shocks were not 
genuine, and thus the morally appropriate action was to defy the experimenter. 
Whatever the relative merits of these opposing positions, they both rely on 
speculation (however cogently argued) concerning the beliefs, understandings and knowledge 
of Milgram’s participants. Moreover, attempts to try and access these are almost inevitably 
hamstrung by issues of accountability. These issues can be circumvented through the 
adoption of a discourse analytic position informed by empirical relativism (see Potter, 1996 
for a detailed outline of the epistemological underpinnings of this approach). This entails a 
commitment to treat all accounts as discursive products worked up to perform particular 
social actions in particular contexts. Such an approach thus moves away from a concern with 
the veridicality of accounts to a concern with their function. We ask not ‘is this true?’ but 
‘what does this do?’ This directs us to look at how participants mobilized psychological 
categories such as beliefs, thoughts and knowledge during the course of the experimental 
sessions themselves.  
 In the present paper, the task of unpacking these issues is begun through focussing in 
particular on knowledge. Transcriptions of the archived recordings are thus approached with a 
view to addressing questions of how participants invoke knowledge in the experimental 
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interactions. The criteria adopted here are therefore quite stringent (and quite straightforward) 
– ‘knowledge’ only becomes a live concern if participants in the interaction make it live. 
Analyst attempts to draw inferences concerning what particular individuals may have ‘known’ 
are thus ruled out by this approach. Following Whalen and Zimmerman (1990) we might 
describe this concern as being with practical epistemology, although — to emphasize the 
slightly broader scope of the present analysis — the term knowledge work is preferred. In 
contrast to the use of this term in the organizational/management literature to refer to those 
parts of an economic system which involve the production of knowledge (in contrast to manual 
work; see, e.g., Alvesson, 2001), ‘knowledge work’ here refers to the rhetorical/interactional 
work undertaken by speakers to manage knowledge-related matters in discourse. My use of the 
term is therefore akin to ‘identity work’, used to refer to the discursive management of identity 
(see, e.g., Benwell & Stokoe, 2006). At all times, the over-arching concern is with what 
participants are doing when they engage in discursive knowledge work. 
Method 
Data 
The data are drawn from the archived audio recordings of Conditions 02 (‘voice-
feedback’) and 20 (‘women as subjects’; re-labelled condition 8 by Milgram, 1974) from the 
obedience experiments. These were selected as they represent two of the most complete 
conditions which used the same basic procedure as perhaps the most well-known version of 
the experiment, presented in Milgram’s (1965) film, Obedience. Obedience levels – defined 
as the percentage of participants who delivered the maximum 450v shock – were 62.5% in 
condition 02 and 65% in condition 20. It is therefore notable that, even in these conditions, 
which yielded some of the highest levels of obedience, over a third of participants managed 
to extricate themselves from the experiment.  
Transcripts of the experimental sessions captured on the recordings were made using 
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a simplified version of Jeffersonian transcription conventions (Jefferson, 2004).
 1
 This allows 
the capturing of detail (e.g. overlap; pause length) which enables analysis of the unfolding 
nature of the experimental interaction. Out of a total sample size of 40 for each condition, 39 
recordings from Condition 02, and 31 from Condition 20, were available and in usable 
condition. Of these, 26 were of defiant participants (14 in condition 02, and 12 in Condition 
20), and it was the recordings and transcripts of these defiant participants’ sessions that 
formed the data for the present analysis. 
Analytic framework and procedure 
The analysis draws on the principles of rhetorical psychology (Billig, 1996) and 
discursive psychology (Edwards & Potter, 1992), members of the wider family of discourse 
analytic perspectives that have become firmly established approaches to qualitative research 
in social psychology over the last 25 years or so (Potter, 2007, 2012; Potter & Wetherell, 
1987). These approaches stress the constitutive nature of discourse and emphasize the 
importance of attending to language use through analysis of participants’ own words. 
Rhetorical psychology draws attention to the role of argumentation (understood broadly) in 
social life, and suggests that individuals are engaged in constant attempts to buttress even the 
most mundane of claims in everyday interaction from potential counter-arguments.  
Discursive psychology has a particular concern with the ways in which psychological 
matters become interactionally ‘live’, and is notable for an ongoing re-specification of the 
‘psychological thesaurus’ (e.g. Edwards, 2005). This involves recasting terms that are 
typically understood as representing underlying metal entities (attitudes, identity, memory, 
etc.) as being participants’ concerns. This has two important implications: conceptually, it 
demands an agnostic stance in relation to the correspondence between terms invoked in 
discourse and any underlying mental entities; empirically, it demands an attention to the ways 
in which psychological terms are invoked in discourse, and specifically the functions they are 
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used to perform. 
The actual process of analysis followed well-established guidelines for rhetorical and 
discursive psychology (Billig, 1997; Potter & Wetherell, 1987), and began with a careful 
reading and re-reading of the transcripts of the defiant participants. Rather than starting with 
a view to identifying knowledge work in the experimental encounters, the concern with 
invocations of knowledge arose from this initial period of extended engagement with the 
data. Particular attention was paid to those sequences in which participants began to 
challenge, or otherwise resist, the experimenter. It was from consideration of these sequences 
that the rhetorical functions of knowledge work began to appear significant. A decision was 
then taken to focus the present analysis solely on invocations of knowledge, and the various 
uses of knowledge were listed on a participant-by-participant basis in order to ascertain their 
rhetorical function. At this stage, the analysis followed Potter and Wetherell’s (1987) 
guidelines for conducting discourse analytic research, with particular attention to their 
recommendation that analysis should proceed with a search for patterns in the data. 
The aim was thus to identify commonalities and distinctions between different uses of 
knowledge. As a qualitative approach, there are no hard-and-fast rules concerning the number 
of instances of a particular phenomenon that need to be observed in order for it to be deemed 
noteworthy, but for present purposes uses of knowledge are only reported where they 
occurred in more than one case. This is not to deny the potential importance of uses of 
knowledge that may have occurred only once, and in order to ensure the robustness of the 
analysis, deviant cases were considered in order to ensure that these instances did not falsify, 
or otherwise complicate, the emerging analytic narrative. Deviant case analysis is a useful 
analytic technique across a number of different qualitative approaches (Silverman, 2006), and 
involves paying particular attention to any cases which may identify the limitations of an 
analytic account.  
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Analysis 
Invocations of knowledge by participants can be broken down into three broad 
categories: knowledge claims (I know), denials of knowledge (I don’t know) and appeals to 
common knowledge (you know). The analysis will deal with each of these in turn. 
‘I know’: Knowledge claims as entitlement and conviction 
In their attempts to argue their way out of the experimental situation, four participants 
made knowledge claims in order to position themselves as entitled to make judgements on the 
nature of the situation, and/or the likely consequences arising from it. For example: 
Extract 1: Participant 2006 
1 L: I’m no longer part of this experiment. 
2 T: I’m sorry I won’t continue. 
3 E: The experiment requires that you go on teacher, 
4  until he’s learned all the words pairs correctly. 
5 T: I will not continue. I’m sorry. 
6 E: It’s essential that you go on. 
7 T: I refuse to be responsible for that man getting sick. 
8  I mean he’s petrified in there and he’s not learning 
9  anything. I know enough about medicine and about 
10  teaching, and I’m sorry to disagree with you I’ll 
11  give you your cheque back gladly but I will not 
12  continue. 
Participant 2006’s initial attempt at withdrawal follows the learner’s own apparent 
withdrawal (line 1-2). This elicits one of the standardized prods from the experimenter, which 
is followed by a re-statement of withdrawal from the participant. Again this only elicits a 
prod from the experimenter, and the participant responds to this with an account of why she 
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will not continue. Participant attempts at extricating themselves from the experiment typically 
followed a similar structure to this, with extended accounts of participants’ reasons for non-
continuation being provided after initial – and more succinct – attempts at withdrawal proved 
unsuccessful. This suggests that participants oriented to the experimenter’s refusal to accept 
their withdrawal as indicating that they needed to account for their decision to withdraw, and 
– importantly – it is in these accounts that we often see participants doing discursive 
knowledge work. 
On lines 9-10 of extract 1, the participant invokes knowledge of medicine and 
teaching in order to warrant her ‘disagree[ment]’ with the experimenter. Such knowledge 
claims function to challenge the authority of the experimenter by positioning the participant 
as having greater (or at least equal) entitlement to make judgements regarding the 
experimental situation. It is notable that the knowledge claim follows the invocation of the 
learner’s own psychological state (l. 8: ‘petrified’) and the assertion that the apparent aim of 
the experiment is not being achieved (ll. 8-9: ‘he’s not learning anything’). The knowledge 
claim thus acts as a warrant for this assertion concerning the failure of the learning task. It is 
notable also that the offer to return the cheque (ll. 10-12), acts as a form of concession to the 
experimenter – the participant is breaking the agreement by seeking to draw the session to a 
close, and so offers to forego payment. Similarly, as Milgram (1974) himself noted, in 
attempting to defy the experimenter, the participant here is nevertheless still orienting to 
norms of politeness (e.g. l. 10: ‘I’m sorry to disagree’). The invocation of knowledge raises 
the intriguing possibility that, in addition, participants were orienting to norms of rationality 
(Billig, 1988): in order to behave in a certain way, one must have good reason and – more to 
the point – one must demonstrate that one has good reason. This can be seen as following 
directly from the experimenter’s refusal to accept more straightforward statements of 
withdrawal. 
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 Participant 2006’s knowledge claim is proffered without further elaboration on how 
she knows what she claims to know (Whalen & Zimmerman, 1990). In contrast, participant 
0230 (referred to as ‘Jan Rensaleer’ by Milgram, 1974) provides a basis for his knowledge 
claim: 
Extract 2: Participant 0230 
1 E: although the shocks may be extremely painful 
2  there is no permanent tissue damage. 
3 T: Yeah but I know I know what shocks do to you I 
4  mean I’m a er an, electrical engineer. And I’ve- 
5  I’ve- I’ve, had shocks too myself an- and you get 
6  real shook up by them and, especially if you know, 
7  that you know, the next one is coming and er 
Here an identity claim (l. 4: ‘I’m ... an, electrical engineer’) is used to warrant the 
knowledge claim (‘I know what shocks do to you’) – an example of what discursive 
psychologists have referred to as category entitlement (e.g. Edwards & Potter, 1992). Indeed, 
the participant then goes on to invoke personal experience of electric shocks to further 
augment his argument (ll. 4-7). It is notable that the knowledge claim follows the 
experimenter’s use of one of the scripted prods concerning the effects of the electric shocks 
(ll. 1-2). The function of the knowledge claim is thus explicitly to contest the experimenter’s 
assertion concerning the absence of ‘permanent tissue damage’, and the focus of the 
participant’s resistance is thus not simply a moral or ethical one, but concerns the entitlement 
to pronounce on the effects of electric shocks – the issue is thus one of rationality. Also of 
note is the status of this formulation as being what conversation analysts term a dispreferred 
response (see Sacks, 1992). This is apparent from the use of a ‘yes but’ formulation at the 
start of 0230’s turn (l. 3) (see Speer & Stokoe, 2012, on the dispreferred status of the removal 
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of consent in research more generally), and is a further indication that norms of politeness are 
still being attended to. 
 The dispreferred status of participants’ attempts to extricate themselves from the 
experimental session could also be marked directly by knowledge claims themselves (N=5). 
Rather than claiming expertise in a particular area relevant to the study, this involved 
participants using ‘I know’ to demonstrate their awareness of the consequences of their 
actions (i.e. terminating the study), yet nevertheless sticking to their position regardless. In 
such cases, variations of the phrase ‘I know but’ were often used: 
Extract 3: Participant 2032 
1 E: It’s absolutely essential that you continue with it. 
2 T: I know it’s essential. 
3 E: As it is outlined. 
4 T: I know it’s essential but it is painful for him. 
Following the experimenter’s prod on line 1, the participant uses a knowledge claim 
to affirm that the ‘essential’ nature of the experiment is (already) known. This is restated on 
line 4, and is followed by a statement concerning the pain experienced by the learner. In 
using ‘I know’ in this way, the participant is treating the information contained in the prod 
(i.e. that it is ‘absolutely essential that you continue’) as being something that was already 
understood (i.e. as previously given information). This information is thus not new, and as 
such makes no difference to the participant’s position (see Edwards, 1997, Chapter 5, for a 
fuller discursive re-working of the given-new distinction). Such formulations concede that the 
participant’s actions are detrimental to the experiment and/or the experimenter, but do so in 
order to dismiss the importance of this consideration relative to the well-being of the learner 
(l. 4: ‘but it is painful for him’). The decision to defy the experimenter is thus positioned by 
participants as having been made in full awareness of the consequences, and in so doing this 
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can be seen as an instance of doing conviction: participants demonstrate their commitment to 
the termination of the experimental session by recasting the experimenter’s emphasis on the 
‘essential’ nature of continuation as a simple restatement of something that they were already 
aware of, and thus had already taken into account in making their decision. This serves to 
undermine the rhetorical force of this particular prod. 
‘I don’t know’: Constructing sufficient uncertainty by denying knowledge 
If knowledge claims constituted one rhetorical tactic for attempting to extricate 
oneself from the experiment, denials of knowledge could be equally effective. Tsui (1991) 
and Diani (2004) have mapped some of the functions of the phrase I don’t know and noted 
how it is used to perform a diverse array of actions beyond merely reporting a speaker’s lack 
of knowledge of something. Of particular note is the observation that I don’t know is often 
used to mark uncertainty. Participants used I don’t know in this way in Milgram’s 
experiments in order to construct the situation as sufficiently uncertain so as to render further 
participation problematic. This took two forms: participants could mobilize a lack of 
knowledge about the learner (N=4), or a lack of knowledge about the experiment itself 
(N=4). Indeed, these denials could co-occur, as in Extract 4: 
Extract 4: Participant 0224 
1 E: Please continue. 
2  (8) 
3 T: No I- I can’t do that. That would be ((inaudible)). 
4  I’d rather, ((inaudible)) rather not. In other words 
5  er, it’s putting him in a bad, position and er, I 
6  believe it might be injurious to him, you know, and 
7  er, I don’t know anything about him or, who he is 
8  or anything 
DISCOURSE, DEFIANCE AND RATIONALITY 13 
 
((13 lines omitted)) 
22 T: Well I’d like to very much but I didn’t realize I 
23  mean in other words I didn’t know that this 
24  particular, in other words, I wouldn’t actually know 
25  but I mean I don’t feel that er, that er, it’s any of my 
26  affair anyway but I mean er er, it doesn’t seem to 
27  me as though it’s er, working out and I, don’t feel as 
28  though I could subject him to that. 
On lines 5-8, Participant 0224 works up his own ignorance of the learner in order to 
warrant his ‘belief’ that ‘it might be injurious to him’. The way in which the lack of 
knowledge of the learner is constructed also contains several discursive devices identified as 
rhetorically powerful by previous research. The claim ‘I don’t know anything about him or, 
who he is or anything’ follows a three-part structure with the first (about him) and second 
(who he is) components followed by a generalized list completer (or anything) (Jefferson, 
1990). This generalized list completer is itself an extreme case formulation, as is the previous 
formulation ‘I don’t know anything’. This works up the lack of knowledge as not merely 
partial or incidental, but as complete and total (Pomerantz, 1986). Subsequently, the 
participant works up a description of himself as now knowing something that he had not 
previously realized (ll. 22-28). This claim to a past lack of knowledge is used to build a 
contrast with a current realization of what is actually involved in the experiment. This allows 
him to minimize his accountability for non-continuation as he can present himself as having 
agreed to take part in the experiment while not in possession of full knowledge about what 
would be entailed. 
 In Extract 4, it is notable that the possibility that the shocks may be ‘injurious’ to the 
learner is accompanied by a marker of common knowledge (l. 6: ‘you know’) which orients 
DISCOURSE, DEFIANCE AND RATIONALITY 14 
 
to the expectation that the experimenter should also appreciate the possibility of harmful 
effects on the learner. It is to such appeals to shared understanding that we now turn. 
‘You know’: Enlisting the experimenter through appeals to common knowledge 
As Schiffrin (1987) notes, the phrase you know can function to mark a particular 
aspect of a situation as being something that a recipient might reasonably be expected to be 
aware of. Following Edwards (1997, p. 114), we might describe this as a matter of pragmatic 
intersubjectivity, which involves a concern with ‘shared knowledge as a participants’ 
concern; what their talk treats as shared, and when, and how’ (emphasis in original). Eight 
participants invoked shared knowledge in this way in the course of defying the experimenter.  
For example, in the following extract, Participant 0226 uses you know to respond to one of 
the experimenter’s special prods by prioritizing the experiential effects of the electric shocks 
over their physical effects: 
Extract 5: Participant 0226 
1 E: As I said before although the, shocks may be 
2  extremely painful there is no permanent tissue 
3  damage. So please continue. 
4 T: That makes no difference. 
5  (6) 
6 T: I hate the pain of the shock, he’s in, you know, 
7  whether there’s permanent tissue damage or not. 
8  So th- I do not wish, to go on any further beyond 
9  this point. 
10  (3) 
11 E: You have no other choice you must go on. 
12 T: Course I have another choice. 
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The participant’s initial response on line 4, which simply dismisses the experimenter’s 
distinction between pain and ‘permanent tissue damage’, occasions a long silence of six 
seconds. The participant orients to this lack of response from the experimenter as an 
indication that a further account is required. He provides this account by working up a strong 
emotional reaction (hate) to the ‘pain of the shock, he’s in’ (l. 6). This is followed by an 
appeal to common knowledge (you know), which functions to mark this hatred of pain as 
something that the experimenter is expected to know, to understand – to share – regardless of 
‘whether there’s permanent tissue damage or not’. Following Schiffrin (1987), this can be 
seen as functioning to draw attention to an aspect of the situation (pain) which the participant 
seeks to problematize. The fact that the experimenter does not attend to this, instead 
responding (after a further period of silence) with Prod 4 (line 11) escalates the disruption of 
the mundane social order, and the participant stands his ground. 
In Extract 6, we see a slightly different type of appeal to common knowledge: 
Extract 6: Participant 2036 
1 T: What do I have to do now? 
2 E: Just continue using the last switch on the board as 
3  a punishment. The four fifty switch. 
4 T: Oh, you know if he has a heart condition I’m a 
5  nurse. 
Here the teacher’s resistance is predicated on an identity claim (‘I’m a nurse’). The 
category-bound activities (Sacks, 1992) of ‘nurse’ are incompatible with administering 
painful electric shocks to someone with a heart condition, and the invocation of this identity 
sets up a particular difficulty for the participant given the incongruity between the act and the 
identity claimed. Moreover, the use of ‘you know’ marks this as common knowledge – 
something that the experimenter might reasonably be expected to know. The participant is 
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not, therefore, presenting her identity claim and explaining to the experimenter why this 
makes it particularly difficult for her to continue with the experiment; the identity claim is 
treated as sufficient on its own, and the marker of common knowledge treats this as 
something that the experimenter should be aware of. 
 Once we begin to pay attention to the experiments as occasions for rhetoric, then, it is 
possible to see how rhetorical struggles over knowledge became central to participant 
attempts at resistance. This bears directly on the nature of the authority processes at work in 
the experiments. Rather than seeing the status of the experimenter (or the institution of Yale 
University) as by definition embodying a particular kind of power through expert knowledge, 
we can begin to conceive of matters of who knows what, and who can be expected to know 
what, as being up for grabs in the unfolding to-and-fro of the experimental session. For some 
participants at least, this discursive ‘knowledge work’ proved to be a viable tactic for 
extricating themselves from the experiment. 
Discussion 
The present paper contributes to the ongoing re-evaluation of the Milgram 
experiments by seeking to shift the focus of attention to defiance and resistance, and to 
language and rhetoric in the experiments. In so doing it further challenges the 50-year 
consensus that the experiments are about obedience, but does so in a novel way. Specifically, 
whereas previous work has pointed out that when the experimenter issued direct orders they 
were largely ineffective (see Burger, Girgis & Manning, 2011; Gibson, 2013b; Haslam, 
Reicher & Birney, 2014; Reicher & Haslam, 2011), here we see that defiant participants were 
able to mobilize their arguments for drawing the experimental session to a close well before 
the experimenter resorted to direct orders. 
In this sense, the participants are not so much disobeying as engaging the 
experimenter in rational debate. The experiments thus begin to look less like a struggle over 
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obedience, and more like a contest of persuasion and a test of rhetorical skill – what Billig 
(1996) has termed witcraft. For example, it is notable that the participants typically address 
the specific content of the prods. The prods are thus perhaps not best understood as orders, 
but rather as rhetoric – as attempts to define the situation in a certain way, which participants 
could challenge, undermine and contest. This also highlights more generally the virtues of 
developing a perspective on social influence which draws on the discursive and rhetorical 
traditions in social psychology (see also Hepburn & Potter, 2011). 
These findings also extend previous work on the ways in which participants’ 
questioning and challenging of the experimenter could lead to it becoming apparent that the 
experimenter was not ‘playing by the rules’ of interaction (see e.g. Modigliani & Rochat, 
1995). For example, markers of common knowledge acted as an appeal to what the 
experimenter might reasonably be expected to understand (e.g. that pain is problematic 
regardless of the lack of ‘permanent tissue damage’). The experimenter, of course, typically 
resisted such appeals. This, arguably, contributes to the emergent sense in which the behavior 
of the experimenter is palpably unusual from the perspective of the participant. 
Limitations 
In considering the limitations of the present analysis, it should be noted that only a 
small selection of conditions have been explored, and only the defiant participants within 
those conditions. Future research would thus be well advised to explore knowledge work by 
participants who did not defy the experimenter, and by participants in other conditions.  
Similarly, it might be suggested that my transcription and selection of material for analysis 
may have inadvertently ‘biased’ the analysis presented here.  It should of course be 
emphasized that the extracts presented above are only a few brief examples from the 
experimental sessions, which were transcribed in their entirety.  This does not mean that my 
analysis here should be taken as the final word on the matter – at the heart of the qualitative 
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research endeavour is the idea that different researchers may focus on different aspects of the 
same data, and in this respect there is undoubtedly much more to be said about the 
experiments analysed here.  Nevertheless, in choosing to focus on knowledge work, I have 
made a series of claims which, I have argued, can be demonstrated in the data.  In this 
respect, qualitative analysis has one notable advantage in that actual extracts from the data 
themselves are presented to illustrate the claims made. 
Policy implications 
The policy implications of the present analysis – and of the broader re-examination of 
Milgram’s work of which it is a part – are numerous. Milgram’s studies have been used in 
explanations of abuses and atrocities such as the Holocaust (see Miller, 2004), the My Lai 
massacre (Milgram, 1974), and the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuses (Lankford, 2009), as well as 
in more general explanations of phenomena such as terrorism (Fiske, Harris & Cuddy, 2004), 
yet it is rare to see them used to draw out lessons concerning how people might resist 
authority. To take just one example of how such issues may be addressed, in the UK 
‘obedience’ is part of the curriculum for diplomas in ‘Public Services (Uniformed)’ (Edexcel, 
2012). Associated textbooks frequently draw out the standard lessons of overwhelming 
obedience from the Milgram experiments (e.g. Cullingworth, 2004; Gray, Stockbridge & 
Vause, 2007), with minimal consideration of the ways in which a sizeable proportion of 
participants managed to defy the experimenter. Re-orienting our view of Milgram’s studies 
through a focus on defiance enables a corrective to this tendency to over-emphasize 
‘obedience’, and instead might be used to facilitate strategies for challenging unjust authority. 
While attempts to draw direct parallels between the highly specific setting of the Milgram 
experiments and any other social context are fraught with difficulty, the findings of the 
present analysis are at least suggestive that the utility of knowledge work as a means to 
challenge authority might fruitfully be explored in other settings. 
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Endnote 
                                                 
1
 In the excerpts from the transcripts, speakers are identified as E (Experimenter), T 
(Teacher) and L (Learner). Other transcription conventions are as follows: 
 (11) Numbers in parentheses indicate a timed silence, with the number indicating 
the amount in seconds. 
I can’t, I A comma indicates a pause of less than a second. 
I- A dash indicates a sharp cut-off of the preceding utterance. 
[continue] Brackets indicate overlapping talk. 
volts. A full-stop (period) indicates a ‘stopping’ intonation, rather than the end of a 
grammatical sentence per se. 
Why? A question mark indicates a questioning intonation, rather than a grammatical 
question per se. 
